The Invasion of Syria and Lebanon
The vanguard force included 13 mixed teams composed of 37 Jewish fighters, 5 Arab guides, 6 Australian officers, one Australian Sergeant and 152 Australian soldiers.
The invasion began on the 7th of June 1941. The vanguard force included 13 mixed teams composed of 37 Jewish fighters, 5 Arab guides, 6 Australian officers, one Australian Sergeant and 152 Australian soldiers.
Three detachments, under the command of Moshe Dayan, Yigal Piekovitz (Alon) and Meir (Meirke) Davidson, were assigned occupation and sabotage missions:
The mission of detachment no. 1, under the command of Moshe Dayan, was to enable passage over the bridges and along the coastal road from Ras En Naqura to Tyre, in the segment near Yiskandron, and to disconnect the telephone line connecting the village with Tyre.
The mission of detachment no. 4, under the command of Meir (Meirke) Davidson, was to serve as a guide for the Australian company on its way to conquer the villages of Itron, Bint-Jebel and Ein Abel, and to disconnect telephone lines between Lablida and Bint-Jebel.
The mission of detachment no. 8, under the command of Yigal Alon was to take control of the bridge over the Litani river to the west of Klia village (near Metula), to prevent its detonation, and to hold it until they were joined by the invading Australian force.
The mission of detachment no. 2, under the command of Itamar Ben Barak, was to secure the passage of the Australian army on the Ras En Naqura – Beirut road, 4 kilometers to the north of Ras En Naqura, and to cut the telephone lines.
The missions of detachments no. 12 and 13 were to serve as guides for the invading Australian force.
Out of the 13 teams, only 12 actually saw operation: Detachment no. 12 did not join the Australian force that is was supposed to lead. The detachment under the command of Moshe Dayan only partially succeeded in fulfilling its mission. Yigal Alon's detachment did not complete its mission. The rest of the missions were completed successfully. During the operation, Moshe Dayan suffered an injury in his eye, and Yitzhak Henkin was hit in the leg. The rest of the fighters returned home safe and sound.
While the commanders of the British army and Australian forces did not attach great importance to the Jewish detachments, and perceived them only as guides who successfully fulfilled their roles, the Hagana attached great importance to them as the basis for military cooperation between British and Jewish units. Heads of the Hagana and the Jewish Agency hoped that following the operation, participation of the Striking Force (Palmach) in British military activities in the region would increase. In the Palmach's battle heritage, this operation was a corner stone, setting an example for operational military missions – the missions for which the Palmach was created. The Palmach's command drew important conclusions and lessons from the operation: Recognition of the vital importance of military training and the necessity of scouting as a condition for operations in the field. The gravity of the shortage of equipment and weapons became clear. And most importantly – it proved that the Palmach's recruits were capable of completing military missions successfully.
Three detachments, under the command of Moshe Dayan, Yigal Piekovitz (Alon) and Meir (Meirke) Davidson, were assigned occupation and sabotage missions:
The mission of detachment no. 1, under the command of Moshe Dayan, was to enable passage over the bridges and along the coastal road from Ras En Naqura to Tyre, in the segment near Yiskandron, and to disconnect the telephone line connecting the village with Tyre.
The mission of detachment no. 4, under the command of Meir (Meirke) Davidson, was to serve as a guide for the Australian company on its way to conquer the villages of Itron, Bint-Jebel and Ein Abel, and to disconnect telephone lines between Lablida and Bint-Jebel.
The mission of detachment no. 8, under the command of Yigal Alon was to take control of the bridge over the Litani river to the west of Klia village (near Metula), to prevent its detonation, and to hold it until they were joined by the invading Australian force.
The mission of detachment no. 2, under the command of Itamar Ben Barak, was to secure the passage of the Australian army on the Ras En Naqura – Beirut road, 4 kilometers to the north of Ras En Naqura, and to cut the telephone lines.
The missions of detachments no. 12 and 13 were to serve as guides for the invading Australian force.
Out of the 13 teams, only 12 actually saw operation: Detachment no. 12 did not join the Australian force that is was supposed to lead. The detachment under the command of Moshe Dayan only partially succeeded in fulfilling its mission. Yigal Alon's detachment did not complete its mission. The rest of the missions were completed successfully. During the operation, Moshe Dayan suffered an injury in his eye, and Yitzhak Henkin was hit in the leg. The rest of the fighters returned home safe and sound.
While the commanders of the British army and Australian forces did not attach great importance to the Jewish detachments, and perceived them only as guides who successfully fulfilled their roles, the Hagana attached great importance to them as the basis for military cooperation between British and Jewish units. Heads of the Hagana and the Jewish Agency hoped that following the operation, participation of the Striking Force (Palmach) in British military activities in the region would increase. In the Palmach's battle heritage, this operation was a corner stone, setting an example for operational military missions – the missions for which the Palmach was created. The Palmach's command drew important conclusions and lessons from the operation: Recognition of the vital importance of military training and the necessity of scouting as a condition for operations in the field. The gravity of the shortage of equipment and weapons became clear. And most importantly – it proved that the Palmach's recruits were capable of completing military missions successfully.