Involvement of the Authorities in the Negev during the Mandate Period
The dominant interest of the Mandatory Authorities during this period was to ensure a smooth evacuation of their institutions and government bodies from Eretz Israel. This interest was congruent with maintaining good relations with both the warring parties – i.e. a neutral approach. In practice, now and again there were deviations from this policy in favor of one of the parties, in accordance with the predisposition of the commanders in the field. This created a great deal of confusion and suspicion amongst our forces.
On Wednesday 19.2.48, a meeting of the Bedouin Sheiks, ordered by the government, was convened at Imara.
At the meeting it was decided to establish two police stations in the Bedouin areas: The Imara station and the Sha'ut station. Imara "sat" on the main transportation artery and water pipeline of the Jewish settlements in the Negev. The desert police stations in the Negev were manned entirely by Arabs. About 45 guards served in the Imra and Asluji stations and there were 35 in Sha'ut. In each of the smaller stations: Huzeil (Shuval), Tel el-Milah and Abu-Jaber, there were 25 Arab guards. The mandatory government supplied these village police stations with 200 guns for self-defense.
It should be mentioned that during the evacuation of the mandatory authorities, the weapons were not collected from the above stations and also not from the Jewish settlements.
The police were given the task of keeping law and order while the army was responsible for the security of the roads during the evacuation of the British forces through Haifa and Egypt. Despite the fact that this policy was adhered to in general, there were some local deviations here and there. These stemmed from a sympathetic attitude, on the part of the officials or commanders executing the orders, to one or other of the parties. Therefore, in certain instances, steps were taken by the authorities that were harmful to us. The lack of consistency in the policies of the authorities was perceived as an attitude od 'hostile neutrality' in relation to the Jews. At the beginning of the hostilities, the British army established a 'Southern Task Force' that included an armored mobile force of medium tanks and half-tracks. The force was based at the El-Burej camp, about 9 kilometers from Gaza, and was active up to the closing stages of the Mandatory period. The function of this force was to ensure the security of all vehicles traveling in both directions on those roads.
Here are some examples of the inconsistent behavior of the task force:
The official contact with the British authorities in the Negev was carried out by the Negev Settlements Committee Chairman - Michael Hanegbi. At the beginning of the hostilities in the Negev, the senior commander of the British police force in the Beer Sheba region, Scott, offered help to Michael Hanegbi in evacuating the settlements in the Negev that, in his opinion, were facing existential dangers. It goes without saying that his advice was rejected out of hand. Michael Hanegbi held talks with the British authorities and demanded that they provide protection on the roads. The response that he received was that the army had decided to ensure that the roads would be fully protected.
On the 1.12.47, the British army stopped a car from the Tekuma settlement. The vehicle was searched and some grenades were found. Four people were arrested but later they were released.
On the 30.12.47, a convoy of 11 trucks and an escort jeep set out from Nir-Am on its way to the north. About 5 kilometers north of Nir-Am, the convoy was stopped by a British patrol. The escort jeep was fired on but it managed to escape. The convoy was searched in a very hostile manner by the patrol for three hours. During the search they found 'illegal arms' that had been hidden. The entire convoy was led to the Iraq Su'edan police station where two people were detained after grenades were found hidden in their clothes and everyone else was released. They confiscated 4 sten-guns, a revolver and grenades. The following day, with the intervention of the British police officers, the arms were returned and the detainees were released.
In accordance with an earlier agreement, on the 1.1.48, military wireless vehicles that escorted a convoy on its way to Gvulot through the coastal road, arrived at Nir-Am. Tanks were placed at crossroads and dangerous points along the road. A British patrol plane circled above the convoy. The convoy was escorted by soldiers of the 2nd Battalion for additional security. The convoy that included 10 trucks loaded with prefabricated huts and supplies, unloaded everything at Gvulot and returned in safety to Nir-Am. Another convoy left on the same day from Nir-Am to the settlements of Bet Eshel and Revivim. When the convoy passed Beer-Sheba it was attacked by gunfire. One British Corporal was killed, two others were seriously wounded and one of our men suffered light injuries. The army was hesitant at first but afterwards they opened fire. One of our armored vehicles was damaged and was towed to Bet Eshel with the help of the army. The army prevented the convoy from returning via Beer-Sheba. Part of the convoy continued on its way and arrived at Revivim.
A serious incident occurred on the 28.1.48, when an armored vehicle carrying 10 people left Hatzerim for Nir-Am. The vehicle took a wrong turn and ended up in Gaza. They were detained at the police station where their arms were confiscated and they were arrested. At the 'Hagana' headquarters they believed that the armored vehicle did not take a wrong turn but was forced to go to Gaza by the British. The British and the Arabs maintained that the vehicle had not been diverted purposely. Michael Hanegbi met with the Brigadier who was the officer in charge of the area. The Brigadier expressed his doubts that the vehicle had entered Gaza unintentionally. On the 8.2.48, the ten people were transferred to Jerusalem in order to stand trial.
On the 31.1.48, the British detained an armored vehicle that was traveling along the length of the pipeline between Be'eri and Tze'elim. The army confiscated the Bren gun magazines and the grenades, claiming that these were assault weapons. The remaining weapons were not confiscated. The army then gave an order forbidding armored vehicles to travel along the pipeline. The following day, an officer from the Be'er Sheba police headquarters came to Be'eri and returned the arms and ammunition, claiming
that the confiscation had been unauthorized. He stated that it is permitted to escort convoys and protect the pipeline with armored vehicles but it is forbidden to stop Arab vehicles and conduct searches on Arab vehicles.
On that same day, the government general secretary gave the following order to the chief supervising officer of the police:
"Searches (for weapons) must not be conducted unless there is clear evidence that the parties have used or intend to use the weapons for any purposes other than protection. The possession of weapons for escort purposes only, provides insufficient grounds for a search….."
At the beginning of March, the general policy of the government was that the 'Hagana' units were not to be disarmed. However, despite this policy, there were several incidents initiated by local commanders, where the 'Hagana' fighters were disarmed and handed over to the Arabs. Following on these incidents, on the 2nd of March Yigal Alon decided to give an order to resist being disarmed and to open fire if necessary "even if it meant causing heavy casualties on our side." Alon believed that active opposition would eventually deter the British army from such acts. On the 5th of March, the 'Hagana' headquarters published an order stating that in case of a weapons search by the British army or police, the weapons are not to be handed over. Should the negotiations fail between the parties and there is an attempt to disarm forcibly, they should fire warning shots in the air and afterwards "they have permission to open fire on the British soldiers or policemen." On the following day the Brigade headquarters transferred the order to all the battalions and settlements. Yigal Alon made a correction on the order in his own handwriting. He erased the words: "they have permission to open fire," and wrote, "they are ordered to open fire."
The order to open fire on the British army was frozen immediately it seems, until Ben Gurion's meeting with the High Commissioner. The meeting indeed took place on the 8th of March but the issue of arms confiscation was not raised. On the 14th of March the headquarters of the Palmach Negev Battalion dispatched an amended order: "to resist with force and gunfire."
The British operation at Mivtahim.
On the 21.4.48, a Palmach squad with 2 "Parpar" armored vehicles went to attack Arab transport vehicles in the Rafiah area. After they set fire to an Arab vehicle in the heart of the Rafiah camps, the squad returned to its base in Mivtahim. The British response was extremely severe, much harsher than the accepted responses in those days.
On the 21.4.48, at 14:45 an armored column, including 2 tanks, half-tracks and a jeep, approached Nirim. An officer with the rank of captain wanted to investigate whether the armored vehicles that attacked the Arab truck in Rafiah were on the kibbutz. He received an answer in the negative. The gates of the kibbutz closed and the kibbutz members took up position. The British captain was told that any attempt to search the settlement will face armed opposition. He went to Mivtahim and the tanks positioned themselves about 200 meters away. The captain entered the kibbutz and claimed that the tracks of the attackers on the truck in Rafiah led to Mivtachim. The Palmach commander, who knew that the "Parpar" armored vehicles had already left the area and a truck with an armored cabin was parked in the courtyard, showed it to the officer and tried to convince him that it was not a military vehicle. A tank then entered the courtyard and towed the truck to Rafiah. In the early evening the Palmach company commander arrived at Mivtahim and scolded the settlement commander and repeated the order to oppose the British with greater resolve. The following afternoon, the British armored column returned to Mivtahim. The officer claimed that he had been ordered to bring the Muktar and the driver to Rafiah for interrogation and undertook to bring them back in the evening. When he was rebuffed he threatened that, if the two do not report to him within 30 minutes, he will give the order to open fire and take them forcibly. The tanks then took up position 250 meters away. A tank approached and tried to open the locked gate. The settlement people were already in their positions and began by firing warning shots. The army responded by aiming bursts of fire at the positions. In response the defenders fired a number of armor piercing shells and the tank distanced itself. The army retaliated with heavy machine-gun fire and shelling from the tanks. At first they hit the armory - the machine gunner who was on the roof was killed. Afterwards they fired on the kibbutz living quarters and on the positions. They continued shelling for a few minutes, firing about 30 shells. The settlement commander raised a white flag and the shelling ceased. The act of raising the white flag was against orders and when the communication lines were reopened, the company commander gave an order to draw out the negotiation time, to spread out to the connecting trenches and not to comply with the British army demands. After a further ultimatum, the firing was resumed with a further 30 shells fired from the tanks onto the positions and the wooden huts. During the second attack the armory, the food storehouse and the stables were hit by the shells. When the attack began, 2 armored vehicles left Gvulot in the direction of Mivtahim. Their objective was to reinforce the kibbutz by penetrating within or alternatively to draw some of the British fire in their direction. At 17:45 the firing ceased and at 18::00 the army left the area and returned to Rafiah. This confrontation took place on the eve of Passover. Despite the destruction and sadness, the Passover Seder was held in the damaged dining hall, attended by the Battalion commander and staff officers.
On the following day, 23.4.48, the army approached Nirim and left the confiscated Mivtahim truck next to the fence. During the day a British army officer paid a visit to Tze'elim with an apology and an explanation that the attack had been carried out by a unit transferred from Egypt and not under the command of the Eretz Israel British army.
At the meeting it was decided to establish two police stations in the Bedouin areas: The Imara station and the Sha'ut station. Imara "sat" on the main transportation artery and water pipeline of the Jewish settlements in the Negev. The desert police stations in the Negev were manned entirely by Arabs. About 45 guards served in the Imra and Asluji stations and there were 35 in Sha'ut. In each of the smaller stations: Huzeil (Shuval), Tel el-Milah and Abu-Jaber, there were 25 Arab guards. The mandatory government supplied these village police stations with 200 guns for self-defense.
It should be mentioned that during the evacuation of the mandatory authorities, the weapons were not collected from the above stations and also not from the Jewish settlements.
The police were given the task of keeping law and order while the army was responsible for the security of the roads during the evacuation of the British forces through Haifa and Egypt. Despite the fact that this policy was adhered to in general, there were some local deviations here and there. These stemmed from a sympathetic attitude, on the part of the officials or commanders executing the orders, to one or other of the parties. Therefore, in certain instances, steps were taken by the authorities that were harmful to us. The lack of consistency in the policies of the authorities was perceived as an attitude od 'hostile neutrality' in relation to the Jews. At the beginning of the hostilities, the British army established a 'Southern Task Force' that included an armored mobile force of medium tanks and half-tracks. The force was based at the El-Burej camp, about 9 kilometers from Gaza, and was active up to the closing stages of the Mandatory period. The function of this force was to ensure the security of all vehicles traveling in both directions on those roads.
Here are some examples of the inconsistent behavior of the task force:
The official contact with the British authorities in the Negev was carried out by the Negev Settlements Committee Chairman - Michael Hanegbi. At the beginning of the hostilities in the Negev, the senior commander of the British police force in the Beer Sheba region, Scott, offered help to Michael Hanegbi in evacuating the settlements in the Negev that, in his opinion, were facing existential dangers. It goes without saying that his advice was rejected out of hand. Michael Hanegbi held talks with the British authorities and demanded that they provide protection on the roads. The response that he received was that the army had decided to ensure that the roads would be fully protected.
On the 1.12.47, the British army stopped a car from the Tekuma settlement. The vehicle was searched and some grenades were found. Four people were arrested but later they were released.
On the 30.12.47, a convoy of 11 trucks and an escort jeep set out from Nir-Am on its way to the north. About 5 kilometers north of Nir-Am, the convoy was stopped by a British patrol. The escort jeep was fired on but it managed to escape. The convoy was searched in a very hostile manner by the patrol for three hours. During the search they found 'illegal arms' that had been hidden. The entire convoy was led to the Iraq Su'edan police station where two people were detained after grenades were found hidden in their clothes and everyone else was released. They confiscated 4 sten-guns, a revolver and grenades. The following day, with the intervention of the British police officers, the arms were returned and the detainees were released.
In accordance with an earlier agreement, on the 1.1.48, military wireless vehicles that escorted a convoy on its way to Gvulot through the coastal road, arrived at Nir-Am. Tanks were placed at crossroads and dangerous points along the road. A British patrol plane circled above the convoy. The convoy was escorted by soldiers of the 2nd Battalion for additional security. The convoy that included 10 trucks loaded with prefabricated huts and supplies, unloaded everything at Gvulot and returned in safety to Nir-Am. Another convoy left on the same day from Nir-Am to the settlements of Bet Eshel and Revivim. When the convoy passed Beer-Sheba it was attacked by gunfire. One British Corporal was killed, two others were seriously wounded and one of our men suffered light injuries. The army was hesitant at first but afterwards they opened fire. One of our armored vehicles was damaged and was towed to Bet Eshel with the help of the army. The army prevented the convoy from returning via Beer-Sheba. Part of the convoy continued on its way and arrived at Revivim.
A serious incident occurred on the 28.1.48, when an armored vehicle carrying 10 people left Hatzerim for Nir-Am. The vehicle took a wrong turn and ended up in Gaza. They were detained at the police station where their arms were confiscated and they were arrested. At the 'Hagana' headquarters they believed that the armored vehicle did not take a wrong turn but was forced to go to Gaza by the British. The British and the Arabs maintained that the vehicle had not been diverted purposely. Michael Hanegbi met with the Brigadier who was the officer in charge of the area. The Brigadier expressed his doubts that the vehicle had entered Gaza unintentionally. On the 8.2.48, the ten people were transferred to Jerusalem in order to stand trial.
On the 31.1.48, the British detained an armored vehicle that was traveling along the length of the pipeline between Be'eri and Tze'elim. The army confiscated the Bren gun magazines and the grenades, claiming that these were assault weapons. The remaining weapons were not confiscated. The army then gave an order forbidding armored vehicles to travel along the pipeline. The following day, an officer from the Be'er Sheba police headquarters came to Be'eri and returned the arms and ammunition, claiming
that the confiscation had been unauthorized. He stated that it is permitted to escort convoys and protect the pipeline with armored vehicles but it is forbidden to stop Arab vehicles and conduct searches on Arab vehicles.
On that same day, the government general secretary gave the following order to the chief supervising officer of the police:
"Searches (for weapons) must not be conducted unless there is clear evidence that the parties have used or intend to use the weapons for any purposes other than protection. The possession of weapons for escort purposes only, provides insufficient grounds for a search….."
At the beginning of March, the general policy of the government was that the 'Hagana' units were not to be disarmed. However, despite this policy, there were several incidents initiated by local commanders, where the 'Hagana' fighters were disarmed and handed over to the Arabs. Following on these incidents, on the 2nd of March Yigal Alon decided to give an order to resist being disarmed and to open fire if necessary "even if it meant causing heavy casualties on our side." Alon believed that active opposition would eventually deter the British army from such acts. On the 5th of March, the 'Hagana' headquarters published an order stating that in case of a weapons search by the British army or police, the weapons are not to be handed over. Should the negotiations fail between the parties and there is an attempt to disarm forcibly, they should fire warning shots in the air and afterwards "they have permission to open fire on the British soldiers or policemen." On the following day the Brigade headquarters transferred the order to all the battalions and settlements. Yigal Alon made a correction on the order in his own handwriting. He erased the words: "they have permission to open fire," and wrote, "they are ordered to open fire."
The order to open fire on the British army was frozen immediately it seems, until Ben Gurion's meeting with the High Commissioner. The meeting indeed took place on the 8th of March but the issue of arms confiscation was not raised. On the 14th of March the headquarters of the Palmach Negev Battalion dispatched an amended order: "to resist with force and gunfire."
The British operation at Mivtahim.
On the 21.4.48, a Palmach squad with 2 "Parpar" armored vehicles went to attack Arab transport vehicles in the Rafiah area. After they set fire to an Arab vehicle in the heart of the Rafiah camps, the squad returned to its base in Mivtahim. The British response was extremely severe, much harsher than the accepted responses in those days.
On the 21.4.48, at 14:45 an armored column, including 2 tanks, half-tracks and a jeep, approached Nirim. An officer with the rank of captain wanted to investigate whether the armored vehicles that attacked the Arab truck in Rafiah were on the kibbutz. He received an answer in the negative. The gates of the kibbutz closed and the kibbutz members took up position. The British captain was told that any attempt to search the settlement will face armed opposition. He went to Mivtahim and the tanks positioned themselves about 200 meters away. The captain entered the kibbutz and claimed that the tracks of the attackers on the truck in Rafiah led to Mivtachim. The Palmach commander, who knew that the "Parpar" armored vehicles had already left the area and a truck with an armored cabin was parked in the courtyard, showed it to the officer and tried to convince him that it was not a military vehicle. A tank then entered the courtyard and towed the truck to Rafiah. In the early evening the Palmach company commander arrived at Mivtahim and scolded the settlement commander and repeated the order to oppose the British with greater resolve. The following afternoon, the British armored column returned to Mivtahim. The officer claimed that he had been ordered to bring the Muktar and the driver to Rafiah for interrogation and undertook to bring them back in the evening. When he was rebuffed he threatened that, if the two do not report to him within 30 minutes, he will give the order to open fire and take them forcibly. The tanks then took up position 250 meters away. A tank approached and tried to open the locked gate. The settlement people were already in their positions and began by firing warning shots. The army responded by aiming bursts of fire at the positions. In response the defenders fired a number of armor piercing shells and the tank distanced itself. The army retaliated with heavy machine-gun fire and shelling from the tanks. At first they hit the armory - the machine gunner who was on the roof was killed. Afterwards they fired on the kibbutz living quarters and on the positions. They continued shelling for a few minutes, firing about 30 shells. The settlement commander raised a white flag and the shelling ceased. The act of raising the white flag was against orders and when the communication lines were reopened, the company commander gave an order to draw out the negotiation time, to spread out to the connecting trenches and not to comply with the British army demands. After a further ultimatum, the firing was resumed with a further 30 shells fired from the tanks onto the positions and the wooden huts. During the second attack the armory, the food storehouse and the stables were hit by the shells. When the attack began, 2 armored vehicles left Gvulot in the direction of Mivtahim. Their objective was to reinforce the kibbutz by penetrating within or alternatively to draw some of the British fire in their direction. At 17:45 the firing ceased and at 18::00 the army left the area and returned to Rafiah. This confrontation took place on the eve of Passover. Despite the destruction and sadness, the Passover Seder was held in the damaged dining hall, attended by the Battalion commander and staff officers.
On the following day, 23.4.48, the army approached Nirim and left the confiscated Mivtahim truck next to the fence. During the day a British army officer paid a visit to Tze'elim with an apology and an explanation that the attack had been carried out by a unit transferred from Egypt and not under the command of the Eretz Israel British army.