דלג לתפריט הראשי (מקש קיצור n) דלג לתוכן הדף (מקש קיצור s) דלג לתחתית הדף (מקש קיצור 2)

The Blowing Up of the Sheikh Hussein Bridge

On the night before 5.2.1948 the Sheikh Hussein Bridge over the Jordan, east of Kibbutz Ma'oz Hayyim in the Beit Shean Valley, was blown up. The aim of the action, which was carried out in the framework of the "Lamed Heh " operation, was to seize the initiative and prove to the enemy that - by damaging the bridge, which served the enemy forces as a transit route to Eretz Israel - the 'Haganah' was able to dictate a timetable.
On the night before 5.2.1948 the Sheikh Hussein Bridge over the Jordan, east of Kibbutz Ma'oz Hayyim in the Beit Shean Valley was blown up. The aim of the action, which was carried out in the framework of the "Lamed Heh" operation, was to seize the initiative and prove to the enemy that - by damaging the bridge, which served the enemy forces as a transit route to Eretz Israel - the 'Haganah' was able to dictate a timetable.
Intelligence was gathered about the enemy, e.g. that the Legion had encamped to the south-east of the bridge. To the east, a police station overlooked the bridge, and a fortified position overlooked its full length. Besides the fortification, an armed vehicle of the Legion was parked all night. To the west of the bridge was a check post with two or three guards. Behind the post stretched a barbed-wire fence. A customs house (Beth Hamekhesh) and a barrier made of barrels, both unguarded at night, stood some 50 m west of the bridge.
Arms were distributed to members of the 1st Battalion led by Yeshayahu Gavish, which was included in the attacking force: guns and machine gunsי, mortars, sten guns and explosives, and they were ordered to carry out the following tasks
A squad of riflemen would approach come as close as possible to the barrier next to the Beth Hamekhesh.
Those with guns and machine guns would take up a position 100 m north of the bridge, to distract the fortified position and police east of the bridge.
A mortar and a machine gun would take up a position 100 m south of the bridge, in the direction of the Legion's camp and police station.
4 A tender with 300 kg of explosives, carrying a sapper and a driver, would wait at Maoz Hayyim for instructions.
The order of activity was laid down in a precise plan. Protected by fire from a cover unit, the squad of riflemen would quietly break through the barrier, distracting the force across the bridge. The tender with the driver and the sapper would then travel as quickly as possible to the bridge, dragging the barbed-wire fence laid on the road with it in the process.
Upon reaching the bridge the driver and sapper would jump from the vehicle, activating the detonation system tied to the sapper's hand. There was a dispute about whether they should jump into the water or run back to the bridge. It was decided that they should decide on the spot, according to the facts on the ground
at the time of the action. After that, it was said, the two would join the cover squad during its withdrawal. The cover sections were instructed to open fire on the enemy if it fired at the sapper and driver, and the three forces would withdraw beyond Beit Hashita. The driver Amikam Alon and the sapper Zvi Protzel were selected to carry out the operation. The explosives were placed in a special carriage installed in the car, and its trigger mechanism was tied to the sapper's hand. At the time when he jumped from the vehicle, the mechanism would be activated, exploding after about five minutes. The two practiced their routine at Ein Harod at different traveling speeds, and the success of the experiments augured very well for the success of the operation.