The second attack on the Nebi Yusha Fortress
The settlements on the Naftali ridge, that found themselves cut off, began to exert pressure for a further attack to be staged on the fortress in order to conquer it and release them from their isolation.
The date of the second attack was set for the 20.4.1948. The A' company of the 3rd Battalion (120 men) under the command of Yitzchak Hochman was chosen for the mission.
The date of the second attack was set for the 20.4.1948. The A' company of the 3rd Battalion (120 men) under the command of Yitzchak Hochman was chosen for the mission.
Three forces participated in the operation:
A holding and diversionary force under the command of Filon Friedman, that was to approach from the Ramot Naftali direction and stage a diversionary attack from the south so that the Arabs would transfer their forces to the southern side. Many of the soldiers in the force were new immigrants and there was concern about their fighting and communication abilities. The holding force, commanded by Itamar Arbel would operate from the south western direction. The holding force was allotted a limited quantity of ammunition (a few score of bullets for each machine gun).
- An obstruction force, consisting of field corps personnel in Ramot Naftali, was assigned to block the road from Malkiya and prevent the arrival of reinforcements from Lebanon.
- A break-through and sabotage force, commanded by Dudu Cherkesky, was to come up from the north-eastern direction through Nachal Kadesh, approach the fences secretly and, under cover of the diversionary attack in the south, to approach and blow a hole in the wall, penetrate the interior and take control of the fortress. Owing to the fact that an attack from the north would be unexpected by the enemy, it seemed that the surprise effect would prove advantageous for the attacking force.
- The command force was situated adjacent to the Filon force and included Itzik Hochman (the company commander who was appointed commander of the operation), a signaler, a courier and a medic. The assistant battalion commander, Moshe Kalman was present as an accompanying observer at the request of the company commander; this was the first operation under his command.
The force had no radio equipment in their possession.
The Company A men, members of the training units from kibbutzim Dafna and Kfar Giladi, were assembled in kibbutz Hulata where the commanders and the soldiers were given a briefing and an explanation on a sand-table. The foundations of the fortress on the northern side, protruded about 70 cm. above ground, and could possibly present some difficulties in preparing the explosion. Therefore an elevation stool for placement of the explosives was prepared in advance.
Before they set out for the operation there was a mishap: only two trucks arrived, therefore they were forced to transport the men in two trips causing a delay in the timetable. The force was transported to the Jahula village from where they began the difficult and grueling climb up from the deep valley, with each man carrying at least 20 kilos of equipment on his back. The climb lasted longer than planned and the diversionary force as well as the blocking force also arrived at their destinations late. The order to attack was given only when it was clear that Dudu's force was in place. The time was 3:00 am.
Filon's force advanced from the south and opened fire from two directions and the enemy within the fortress indeed moved its forces to the southern side, as planned.
Concurrently, the assault unit approached the barbed-wire fence, undetected, from the north and began to cut through it quietly with cutting tools. As aforementioned, the force had no prior information about the number of barbed-wire barriers and the cutting process was very lengthy. They began to have some misgivings about not being able to carry out the operation in the dark and the commander of the operation radioed Dudu to break through the fences using the 'bungalor' (a pipe filled with explosives). After the explosion, the men were to enter carrying their explosive devices, place them on the raised stool and activate them.
The 'bungalor' was detonated and the men burst into the outer enclosure of the fortress, only to discover that the elevation stool had been lost along the way. The commanders of the assault unit, Moshe Ne'eman and Yosef Ohali, ordered the men to pile up rocks and stones in order to reach the base of the building. The explosives were primed but the explosion of the 'bungalor' had drawn the attention of the Arabs to the assault force that came from the north and they began to fire and throw grenades from the fortress windows onto the assault force. Some of the men were injured and the commander decided to evacuate them, thus losing the chance for the force to activate the explosives.
Dawn broke during the time that the assault unit arrived at the scene and tried to evacuate the many wounded fighters. They soon became an easy target (in contrast to the present day terrain, the hill was completely barren and exposed in April 1948). Dudu ordered the forces to retreat with each man carrying a wounded fighter. The retreat took place, covered by the machine-gun fire of Yizhar Armoni who continued firing until he was killed.
Armoni was posthumously honored with the highest award of valor – "Hero of Israel", for this heroic action.
During the retreat the force was also fired on from the northern side of the valley, by members of the Hamadon tribe, resulting in further casualties. The retreat took place under difficult conditions: on a steep slope, under fire, and with a great number of casualties.
The southern force remained in its firing positions in order to aid the northern force in its retreat, but they too were revealed to the enemy in the fortress when dawn broke. When they began to retreat, a number of fighters were injured and they were obliged to remain in their place.
Their commander, Filon, ordered the company to continue retreating and he himself remained with the wounded men. When the Arabs came out of the fortress, they attacked and killed all the wounded men who remained in the area. Some of the wounded men had managed to continue on their own and succeeded in reaching Ramot Naftali; they went down to the Hula valley only on the following night.
In this operation, 22 fighters were killed and many were wounded.
A holding and diversionary force under the command of Filon Friedman, that was to approach from the Ramot Naftali direction and stage a diversionary attack from the south so that the Arabs would transfer their forces to the southern side. Many of the soldiers in the force were new immigrants and there was concern about their fighting and communication abilities. The holding force, commanded by Itamar Arbel would operate from the south western direction. The holding force was allotted a limited quantity of ammunition (a few score of bullets for each machine gun).
- An obstruction force, consisting of field corps personnel in Ramot Naftali, was assigned to block the road from Malkiya and prevent the arrival of reinforcements from Lebanon.
- A break-through and sabotage force, commanded by Dudu Cherkesky, was to come up from the north-eastern direction through Nachal Kadesh, approach the fences secretly and, under cover of the diversionary attack in the south, to approach and blow a hole in the wall, penetrate the interior and take control of the fortress. Owing to the fact that an attack from the north would be unexpected by the enemy, it seemed that the surprise effect would prove advantageous for the attacking force.
- The command force was situated adjacent to the Filon force and included Itzik Hochman (the company commander who was appointed commander of the operation), a signaler, a courier and a medic. The assistant battalion commander, Moshe Kalman was present as an accompanying observer at the request of the company commander; this was the first operation under his command.
The force had no radio equipment in their possession.
The Company A men, members of the training units from kibbutzim Dafna and Kfar Giladi, were assembled in kibbutz Hulata where the commanders and the soldiers were given a briefing and an explanation on a sand-table. The foundations of the fortress on the northern side, protruded about 70 cm. above ground, and could possibly present some difficulties in preparing the explosion. Therefore an elevation stool for placement of the explosives was prepared in advance.
Before they set out for the operation there was a mishap: only two trucks arrived, therefore they were forced to transport the men in two trips causing a delay in the timetable. The force was transported to the Jahula village from where they began the difficult and grueling climb up from the deep valley, with each man carrying at least 20 kilos of equipment on his back. The climb lasted longer than planned and the diversionary force as well as the blocking force also arrived at their destinations late. The order to attack was given only when it was clear that Dudu's force was in place. The time was 3:00 am.
Filon's force advanced from the south and opened fire from two directions and the enemy within the fortress indeed moved its forces to the southern side, as planned.
Concurrently, the assault unit approached the barbed-wire fence, undetected, from the north and began to cut through it quietly with cutting tools. As aforementioned, the force had no prior information about the number of barbed-wire barriers and the cutting process was very lengthy. They began to have some misgivings about not being able to carry out the operation in the dark and the commander of the operation radioed Dudu to break through the fences using the 'bungalor' (a pipe filled with explosives). After the explosion, the men were to enter carrying their explosive devices, place them on the raised stool and activate them.
The 'bungalor' was detonated and the men burst into the outer enclosure of the fortress, only to discover that the elevation stool had been lost along the way. The commanders of the assault unit, Moshe Ne'eman and Yosef Ohali, ordered the men to pile up rocks and stones in order to reach the base of the building. The explosives were primed but the explosion of the 'bungalor' had drawn the attention of the Arabs to the assault force that came from the north and they began to fire and throw grenades from the fortress windows onto the assault force. Some of the men were injured and the commander decided to evacuate them, thus losing the chance for the force to activate the explosives.
Dawn broke during the time that the assault unit arrived at the scene and tried to evacuate the many wounded fighters. They soon became an easy target (in contrast to the present day terrain, the hill was completely barren and exposed in April 1948). Dudu ordered the forces to retreat with each man carrying a wounded fighter. The retreat took place, covered by the machine-gun fire of Yizhar Armoni who continued firing until he was killed.
Armoni was posthumously honored with the highest award of valor – "Hero of Israel", for this heroic action.
During the retreat the force was also fired on from the northern side of the valley, by members of the Hamadon tribe, resulting in further casualties. The retreat took place under difficult conditions: on a steep slope, under fire, and with a great number of casualties.
The southern force remained in its firing positions in order to aid the northern force in its retreat, but they too were revealed to the enemy in the fortress when dawn broke. When they began to retreat, a number of fighters were injured and they were obliged to remain in their place.
Their commander, Filon, ordered the company to continue retreating and he himself remained with the wounded men. When the Arabs came out of the fortress, they attacked and killed all the wounded men who remained in the area. Some of the wounded men had managed to continue on their own and succeeded in reaching Ramot Naftali; they went down to the Hula valley only on the following night.
In this operation, 22 fighters were killed and many were wounded.