Preparations for a giant convoy
Shortly before 20.4.48, while the “Harel” brigade was making preparations for two operations against the villages of Beit Suri, Qabido, Beit Mahsir, Dir Ayoub, and Beit Jiz, in anticipation of a revival of the forces of the “Jihad al-Muqads” (“Holy Jihad”), orders came down from GHQ: On 20.4.48, another giant convoy was to be dispatched; the brigade was to make the necessary preparations for “Operation Yevusi”.
During this operation, three large convoys were dispatched: a total of 450 vehicles, with 1800 tons of supplies. At the Bilu camp beside Rehovot, a large supply depot was set up, and 300 trucks assembled. About 1000 men --- including drivers, mechanics and porters --- were recruited to man this operation. Many of the drivers refused to go, because of the danger involved: sever disciplinary measures were required to compel them to their duty. Some 200 trucks afterwards remained marooned in the city, with no possibility of getting back down to the plain, until the “Burma Road” was complete.
While the convoys were on the move, the following security forces were operative in the sector:
--- Units from the Fifth Battalion occupied outposts on both sides of the route in the sector between Arab Hulda and Latrun. Units of the Fourth Battalion occupied outposts in the eastern sector, from Sha’ar Hagai to the outskirts of Jerusalem.
--- Armed escorts, including two companies from the Fifth Battalion and the 54th Battalion, accompanied the convoy as vanguard, rearguard, and mobile reserve within the convoy itself.
--- One to two companies from the 54th Battalion were stationed at Hulda as a general reserve.
The entire convoy, including all escorting units, came under the authority of “Harel” brigade headquarters. Harry Yafeh, who was responsible for civilian transport, was put in charge of all transport services.
Shortly before 20.4.48, while the “Harel” brigade was making preparations for two operations against the villages of Beit Suri, Qabido, Beit Mahsir, Dir Ayoub, and Beit Jiz, in anticipation of a revival of the forces of the “Jihad al-Muqads” (“Holy Jihad”), orders came down from GHQ: On 20.4.48, another giant convoy was to be dispatched; the brigade was to make the necessary preparations for “Operation Yevusi”.
David Shaltiel, CO of the “Ezioni” brigade, on 18.4. 48, told Yigael Yadin of his concern about the large numbers of Arabs congregating in the northern neighborhoods of Jerusalem, and about the quantities of weapons reaching them. He pointed out that the British would shortly be evacuating the government offices in Jerusalem, and that it was essential to bring up forces to occupy these buildings as they were evacuated. In Shaltiel’s view, eight companies would be needed to retain control in the city.
The Palmach command would have preferred to complete the occupation of key points on the way to Jerusalem, and to bring the brigade up to the city itself only on the eve of the British evacuation. They feared that bringing forces up to Jerusalem would lead to the road being closed once more. Battalion commander Tabenkin believed that there was not sufficient information to confirm Shaltiel’s estimate of the situation in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the high command decided to proceed with “Operation Yevusi” within the city, and to entrust its execution to the “Harel” brigade, who were at that time the only force available to occupy the areas which would be evacuated.
While the convoys were on the move, the following security forces were operative in the sector:
--- Units from the Fifth Battalion occupied outposts on both sides of the route in the sector between Arab Hulda and Latrun. Units of the Fourth Battalion occupied outposts in the eastern sector, from Sha’ar Hagai to the outskirts of Jerusalem.
--- Armed escorts, including two companies from the Fifth Battalion and the 54th Battalion, accompanied the convoy as vanguard, rearguard, and mobile reserve within the convoy itself.
--- One to two companies from the 54th Battalion were stationed at Hulda as a general reserve.
The entire convoy, including all escorting units, came under the authority of “Harel” brigade headquarters. Harry Yafeh, who was responsible for civilian transport, was put in charge of all transport services.
Shortly before 20.4.48, while the “Harel” brigade was making preparations for two operations against the villages of Beit Suri, Qabido, Beit Mahsir, Dir Ayoub, and Beit Jiz, in anticipation of a revival of the forces of the “Jihad al-Muqads” (“Holy Jihad”), orders came down from GHQ: On 20.4.48, another giant convoy was to be dispatched; the brigade was to make the necessary preparations for “Operation Yevusi”.
David Shaltiel, CO of the “Ezioni” brigade, on 18.4. 48, told Yigael Yadin of his concern about the large numbers of Arabs congregating in the northern neighborhoods of Jerusalem, and about the quantities of weapons reaching them. He pointed out that the British would shortly be evacuating the government offices in Jerusalem, and that it was essential to bring up forces to occupy these buildings as they were evacuated. In Shaltiel’s view, eight companies would be needed to retain control in the city.
The Palmach command would have preferred to complete the occupation of key points on the way to Jerusalem, and to bring the brigade up to the city itself only on the eve of the British evacuation. They feared that bringing forces up to Jerusalem would lead to the road being closed once more. Battalion commander Tabenkin believed that there was not sufficient information to confirm Shaltiel’s estimate of the situation in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the high command decided to proceed with “Operation Yevusi” within the city, and to entrust its execution to the “Harel” brigade, who were at that time the only force available to occupy the areas which would be evacuated.