Analysis
As with other operations, the questions which arise here are:
- Was it correct to staion regimental HQ so far from the battle?
- Were the forces assigned to this operation (a) large enough, and (b) sufficiently well trained?
- Was it correct to staion regimental HQ so far from the battle?
- Were the forces assigned to this operation (a) large enough, and (b) sufficiently well trained?
A number of questions were raised, and criticisms voiced, after the failure of the attack on Nabi Samuel.
1. The failure to keep to the timetable turned the battle, which should have taken place at night, into a daylight encounter.
2. The prior attack on Beit Iksa eliminated the element of surprise, putting the people of Nabi Samuel on the alert.
3. The close formation in which “Poza”’s company moved caused them heavy losses, and was a mistake.
4. Was “Poza” right in continuing with his mission, despite his CO’s order?
5. The confusion in “B” company, after it was first fired on, made an immediate attack --- which might have succeeded --- impossible. Instead, a retreat in difficult conditions was necessary.
Considering the very difficult terrain, was the force assigned to this operation large enough, or well enough trained, for such a hazardous enterprise?
1. The failure to keep to the timetable turned the battle, which should have taken place at night, into a daylight encounter.
2. The prior attack on Beit Iksa eliminated the element of surprise, putting the people of Nabi Samuel on the alert.
3. The close formation in which “Poza”’s company moved caused them heavy losses, and was a mistake.
4. Was “Poza” right in continuing with his mission, despite his CO’s order?
5. The confusion in “B” company, after it was first fired on, made an immediate attack --- which might have succeeded --- impossible. Instead, a retreat in difficult conditions was necessary.
Considering the very difficult terrain, was the force assigned to this operation large enough, or well enough trained, for such a hazardous enterprise?