The attack on the convoy
Thus it came about, that while the vanguard of the convoy was being greeted with cheers on its arrival in Jerusalem, the attacks on the rearguard increased in violence --- and the commander of the Fifth Battalion, Menahem Rusak, was unable to use his forces effectively, because they were scattered throughout the convoy without means of communication.
The huge convoy, about 8 kilometers long, set out at 0600. At 0730, on the stretch of road between Dir Ayoub and Sha’ar Hagai, it encountered small ambushes along a section of road about 2 kilometers long, from Dir Ayoub until past Bab-el-Wad. They were in camouflaged positions along the slopes. Their fire was at first ineffectual, and did not slow the advance. A platoon of armored vehicles under Oved Michaeli, was posted opposite the hill, and covered the advance of the convoy. Later on, two more powerful groups were encountered, by Dir Ayub and the lower pump houses. The firing became stronger and more effective.
Thus it came about, that while the vanguard of the convoy was being greeted with cheers on its arrival in Jerusalem, the attacks on the rearguard increased in violence --- and the commander of the Fifth Battalion, Menahem Rusak, was unable to use his forces effectively, because they were scattered throughout the convoy without means of communication.
The convoy proceeded slowly on its way, while the shooting of the Arabs became ever more intense and more accurate. Some of the drivers speeded up to get past the ambush, while others, particularly those whose vehicles had no armor, left the trucks and took cover in the ditches. The abandoned and damaged vehicles blocked the road, making the entire convoy an easy target for the Arab snipers. Despite the numerical advantage of the defenders, their being scattered along the length of the convoy made it impossible to do anything against the attackers, who made good use of the terrain. The company of armored vehicles turned back, returned to the site of the ambush, and engaged the attackers. Men of the Fourth Battalion, who were in positions north of Bab-el-Wad, fired at the attackers on the south side of the road.
By 1000 there were about 80 to 100 vehicles (about a quarter of the convoy) stuck at the entrance to Sha’ar Hagai, with no way of getting out. The Arabs, realizing the situation, began to come down the slopes, yelling and howling in a way calculated to demoralize the drivers, soldiers and others trapped below. At 1000, after the rearguard had passed Dir Ayoub, the Arabs blew up a bridge near Latrun, making retreat impossible.
Several officers took the initiative, and began to organize the soldiers in defence of the trucks and of the wounded, who were being taken care of by the women of the battalion. Company commander Ya’aqov Stozky led a charge upon an Arab outpost at the top of the hill. The attack failed on the very difficult terrain, and Stotzky and three of his men were killed. The battalion’s deputy intelligence officer, Yosef Simbol, with a group of volunteers, reached the top of the hill, and from there opened fire upon the Arabs, who were making their way down the slopes to reach our wounded. Simbol too was killed in the fighting. These actions encouraged the remaining men somewhat, and their officers were able to start getting them organized. The armorer, Tzadok Gol, managed to set up a machine gun on a stack of sacks of flour on the back of a truck, and opened an effective fire upon the Arab attackers.
Some of the drivers also showed initiative. Gabriel Rapoport (“Gavrush”) jumped on a large truck loaded with flour, all of whose tires had been shot away, started it up, and driving on the rims, brought it to Kiryat Anavim. Another driver took off, despite the heavy fire, in an open pick-up truck loaded with mines and high explosives. He picked up a wounded comrade, and despite having two tires shot out, also managed to reach Kiryat Anavim.
The soldiers in the armored vehicles kept up continuous machine gun fire against the attackers, while their wounded comrades were loaded into the vehicles through the openings in the bottom.
At the height of the battle Yitzhak Rabin, C.O. of the “Harel” brigade, arrived with the rearguard on the scene of the ambush. He saw that the trapped force would be unable to extricate itself unaided. He therefore drove on rapidly to the Fourth Battalion’s base at Ma’aleh Hahamisha, where the men were resting after a night’s heavy fighting. There he ordered Yosef Tabenkin, the battalion commander, to get his men together and go to the rescue of the convoy. One company set out in armored vehicles, and another left on foot to reinforce the outposts north of Sha’ar Hagai. He also authorized the use of the armored cars fitted with cannon, which had been stolen from the British and concealed there up till then.
The armored force arrived on the scene of the ambush and divided into two. One platoon took a holding position, and began silencing the enemy’s fire. The other moved up and down the road, firing on the attackers as it went. By 1500 the enemy fire had ceased, and the men began towing away the damaged vehicles, and gathering the dead and wounded. A few severely damaged trucks were left on the spot and set on fire. The men of the Fourth Battalion salvaged about 45 vehicles.
A total of 170 trucks reached Jerusalem. Eighty more were forced to return to Hulda. There were 15 killed and 44 wounded, most of them from the Fifth Battalion.
Following the battle, the Arabs sabotaged the road at several points, and made it impassable. Most of the vehicles of the convoy --- about 200 --- remained with their drivers in Jerusalem for another six weeks, until the opening of the “Burma Road”.
The names of the remaining dead: Ya’aqov Becher; Rehavia Berman; Tzadok Gol; Moshe Gershowitz; Oscar Hoiman; Yitzhak Singer; Meir “Zohar” Meir; Maccabi Motzri; Yosef Minyan; Ya’aqov Stotsky; Yosef Simbol; Yehoshua Rabinovitz; Avraham Shantz; and Israel Schwartz.
Thus it came about, that while the vanguard of the convoy was being greeted with cheers on its arrival in Jerusalem, the attacks on the rearguard increased in violence --- and the commander of the Fifth Battalion, Menahem Rusak, was unable to use his forces effectively, because they were scattered throughout the convoy without means of communication.
The convoy proceeded slowly on its way, while the shooting of the Arabs became ever more intense and more accurate. Some of the drivers speeded up to get past the ambush, while others, particularly those whose vehicles had no armor, left the trucks and took cover in the ditches. The abandoned and damaged vehicles blocked the road, making the entire convoy an easy target for the Arab snipers. Despite the numerical advantage of the defenders, their being scattered along the length of the convoy made it impossible to do anything against the attackers, who made good use of the terrain. The company of armored vehicles turned back, returned to the site of the ambush, and engaged the attackers. Men of the Fourth Battalion, who were in positions north of Bab-el-Wad, fired at the attackers on the south side of the road.
By 1000 there were about 80 to 100 vehicles (about a quarter of the convoy) stuck at the entrance to Sha’ar Hagai, with no way of getting out. The Arabs, realizing the situation, began to come down the slopes, yelling and howling in a way calculated to demoralize the drivers, soldiers and others trapped below. At 1000, after the rearguard had passed Dir Ayoub, the Arabs blew up a bridge near Latrun, making retreat impossible.
Several officers took the initiative, and began to organize the soldiers in defence of the trucks and of the wounded, who were being taken care of by the women of the battalion. Company commander Ya’aqov Stozky led a charge upon an Arab outpost at the top of the hill. The attack failed on the very difficult terrain, and Stotzky and three of his men were killed. The battalion’s deputy intelligence officer, Yosef Simbol, with a group of volunteers, reached the top of the hill, and from there opened fire upon the Arabs, who were making their way down the slopes to reach our wounded. Simbol too was killed in the fighting. These actions encouraged the remaining men somewhat, and their officers were able to start getting them organized. The armorer, Tzadok Gol, managed to set up a machine gun on a stack of sacks of flour on the back of a truck, and opened an effective fire upon the Arab attackers.
Some of the drivers also showed initiative. Gabriel Rapoport (“Gavrush”) jumped on a large truck loaded with flour, all of whose tires had been shot away, started it up, and driving on the rims, brought it to Kiryat Anavim. Another driver took off, despite the heavy fire, in an open pick-up truck loaded with mines and high explosives. He picked up a wounded comrade, and despite having two tires shot out, also managed to reach Kiryat Anavim.
The soldiers in the armored vehicles kept up continuous machine gun fire against the attackers, while their wounded comrades were loaded into the vehicles through the openings in the bottom.
At the height of the battle Yitzhak Rabin, C.O. of the “Harel” brigade, arrived with the rearguard on the scene of the ambush. He saw that the trapped force would be unable to extricate itself unaided. He therefore drove on rapidly to the Fourth Battalion’s base at Ma’aleh Hahamisha, where the men were resting after a night’s heavy fighting. There he ordered Yosef Tabenkin, the battalion commander, to get his men together and go to the rescue of the convoy. One company set out in armored vehicles, and another left on foot to reinforce the outposts north of Sha’ar Hagai. He also authorized the use of the armored cars fitted with cannon, which had been stolen from the British and concealed there up till then.
The armored force arrived on the scene of the ambush and divided into two. One platoon took a holding position, and began silencing the enemy’s fire. The other moved up and down the road, firing on the attackers as it went. By 1500 the enemy fire had ceased, and the men began towing away the damaged vehicles, and gathering the dead and wounded. A few severely damaged trucks were left on the spot and set on fire. The men of the Fourth Battalion salvaged about 45 vehicles.
A total of 170 trucks reached Jerusalem. Eighty more were forced to return to Hulda. There were 15 killed and 44 wounded, most of them from the Fifth Battalion.
Following the battle, the Arabs sabotaged the road at several points, and made it impassable. Most of the vehicles of the convoy --- about 200 --- remained with their drivers in Jerusalem for another six weeks, until the opening of the “Burma Road”.
The names of the remaining dead: Ya’aqov Becher; Rehavia Berman; Tzadok Gol; Moshe Gershowitz; Oscar Hoiman; Yitzhak Singer; Meir “Zohar” Meir; Maccabi Motzri; Yosef Minyan; Ya’aqov Stotsky; Yosef Simbol; Yehoshua Rabinovitz; Avraham Shantz; and Israel Schwartz.