The Plan
The plan called for an operation at brigade level. The Fifth Battalion was to capture outpost 13. Who is on top of outpost 14, a very strong position, commanding the entire Latrun area. After outpost 13 was captured, the Third Battalion of the “Yiftach” brigade was to link up with the Fifth Battalion, and then move on to take outpost 14.
The plan called for the Fifth Battalion to capture outpost 13 (Hill 350), to the east of outpost 14. The latter was a very strong position (Hill 315.5) which commanded the entire Latrun salient. Outpost 13 was to be a springboard for the assault and capture of outpost 14 --- the central and most strongly defended position of all. The orders of the Third Battalion of the “Yiftach” brigade, under Moshe Kalman, were to link up with the Fifth Battalion after the capture of outpost 13, and from there to assault and capture outpost 14, under covering fire from the Fifth Battalion. The First Battalion of The “Yiftach” brigade, under Dan Lanner, was to be held in reserve, after first carrying out diversionary activities at the Latrun police station and the villages of El Kuba. According to intelligence reports, a very strong Arab Legion force (two companies) was holding outpost 14, whereas in outpost 13 there were one, or at most two, platoons.
This was the first operation planned at brigade level. Time was short. A supreme headquarters was hastily set up, commanded by Yigal Alon, seconded by David Marcus (“Mickey Stone”), a former colonel in the U.S. army, who had just been appointed by Ben Gurion to the command of the Jerusalem front. The CO of the Yiftach brigade, just arrived from Galilee, was placed in command of the operation. Hasty changes were made in the command of the “Harel” brigade and of the Fifth Battalion. Yissachar (“Iska”) Shadmi was put in command of the Fifth Battalion.
The Fifth Battalion was only able to put together a single infantry company, under the command of Zivi Tzafriri. This company was cobbled together from the survivors of the battalion’s original two companies, together with a contingent of raw recruits from the “immigrant battalions”, who had reached the battalion only a few days before. A second infantry company was put together with men of the headquarters company, the support company, the general service unit, and a few men from what remained of the Sixth Battalion. Another company of raw recruits, from the Fourth Battalion, was held in reserve.
The time remaining was very short. Consequently, --- despite the complexity of the operation, with one attack contingent on the success of another --- no joint reconnaissance surveys were carried out. There was no preliminary coordination between the two battalions which were to link up at outpost 13. The respective commanders did not meet even once before the operation, and no radio communication channels were set up between them. There was not even direct visual communication, nor any agreed identification signals. There was no reconnaissance in preparation for movement by night. Headquarters of the Fifth Battalion were set up at the Hetuleh outpost close to the scene of operations, and operation headquarters were at outpost 10, about 5 kilometers away.
This was the first operation planned at brigade level. Time was short. A supreme headquarters was hastily set up, commanded by Yigal Alon, seconded by David Marcus (“Mickey Stone”), a former colonel in the U.S. army, who had just been appointed by Ben Gurion to the command of the Jerusalem front. The CO of the Yiftach brigade, just arrived from Galilee, was placed in command of the operation. Hasty changes were made in the command of the “Harel” brigade and of the Fifth Battalion. Yissachar (“Iska”) Shadmi was put in command of the Fifth Battalion.
The Fifth Battalion was only able to put together a single infantry company, under the command of Zivi Tzafriri. This company was cobbled together from the survivors of the battalion’s original two companies, together with a contingent of raw recruits from the “immigrant battalions”, who had reached the battalion only a few days before. A second infantry company was put together with men of the headquarters company, the support company, the general service unit, and a few men from what remained of the Sixth Battalion. Another company of raw recruits, from the Fourth Battalion, was held in reserve.
The time remaining was very short. Consequently, --- despite the complexity of the operation, with one attack contingent on the success of another --- no joint reconnaissance surveys were carried out. There was no preliminary coordination between the two battalions which were to link up at outpost 13. The respective commanders did not meet even once before the operation, and no radio communication channels were set up between them. There was not even direct visual communication, nor any agreed identification signals. There was no reconnaissance in preparation for movement by night. Headquarters of the Fifth Battalion were set up at the Hetuleh outpost close to the scene of operations, and operation headquarters were at outpost 10, about 5 kilometers away.