The Battle
The Fifth Battalion missed its way, and attacked outpost 14 instead of outpost 13. Outpost 14 was defended by a large force of the Arab Legion; nevertheless, the undermanned Fifth Battalion succeeded in taking the outpost after very fierce fighting, with severe losses. The Third Battalion, approached outpost 13, met with some desultory fire, and withdrew. Operation HQ, unwilling for a daylight encounter, ordered a retreat.
On June 8 1948 at 2100, two companies of the Fifth Battalion marched westward from Sha’ar Hagai. The force entered the wadi between outposts 13 and 14. Then, instead of turning toward outpost 13, they marched straight for outpost 14 beside Latrun. This position was defended on all sides by a strong force. Major al-Rusan, operations officer of the Legion, stated in a report (which reached us only after the war was over), that the defending forces included an infantry company of the Legion, a support company, a unit of 81 mm mortars, armored vehicles, artillery observation officers, and regimental headquarters.
After midnight, the advance platoon of our force made contact with a Legion forward position. Zivi, unaware of the error in navigation, gave the order for the assault. The legion forces, taken by surprise, held their ground. Fierce fighting began in the trenches, and in one position after the other. The enemy lit the area with flares, and opened intense fire. Within a few hours, the attacking force had overrun the defencers on the slope, and was advancing toward the sheikh’s tomb at the top of the hill.
The number of dead and wounded was increasing. Zivi demand
from Iska, the battalion commander, with whom he was in continual radio contact, to have an Immediate assistance. As the Third Battalion advanced, they ran into some light enemy fire, and one soldier was wounded. Moshe Kelman, the commander of the third battalion understood by than, that outpost 13 was not conquered by the Fifth battalion men and that they are fighting on outpost 14, instead.; his men was again ordered to proceed toward outpost 13, and again his men ran into opposing fire. They withdrew. Operation HQ were unable to interpret the situation on the ground, and failed to realize the enormous advantage gained by the Fifth Battalion. Meanwhile, time was flying. For three more hours, the Fifth Battalion’s limited forces fought on, capturing most of the positions on the hill. The Legion began to withdraw, after three successive counterattacks failed, even though supported by artillery fire. Our forces, however, greatly reduced by severe losses, were growing weaker.
At operation HQ it was feared that the Fifth Battalion would be exposed by daylight, in the heart of the enemy camp, and without the support which they should have had. At 0530, the order was given to withdraw as rapidly as possible, without cover, before day should break. A hasty retreat began from the captured positions, coming under fire from the enemy, who were returning to their positions on outpost 14. During the withdrawal, our forces suffered further casualties, while striving to keep as well organized as possible. The uninjured soldiers kept up fire from the positions they still held, covering the retreat of 60 of their wounded companions. Some of the wounded were helped along by comrades, some were carried on stretchers; others moved unassisted.
As day broke, the Arabs recovered and returned to their abandoned positions. They resumed firing with every weapon they had. The last soldier to bring up the rear of the retreating forces was the company commander, Zivi Tzafriri.
In this battle we lost 18 men and 60 wounded.
Despite the overall failure, some positive achievements can be claimed. The Arab Legion, with its British patronage, lost some of its confidence and self-esteem. Legion forces were diverted from Jerusalem to Latrun, thus relieving some of the pressure on the besiged city. These forces were bottled up in the Latrun salient, and were thus prevented from being active elsewhere; and the section of road joining the ”Burma Road” to Sha’ar Hagai, which had hitherto been under fire from Latrun, was henceforward open to traffic.
After midnight, the advance platoon of our force made contact with a Legion forward position. Zivi, unaware of the error in navigation, gave the order for the assault. The legion forces, taken by surprise, held their ground. Fierce fighting began in the trenches, and in one position after the other. The enemy lit the area with flares, and opened intense fire. Within a few hours, the attacking force had overrun the defencers on the slope, and was advancing toward the sheikh’s tomb at the top of the hill.
The number of dead and wounded was increasing. Zivi demand
from Iska, the battalion commander, with whom he was in continual radio contact, to have an Immediate assistance. As the Third Battalion advanced, they ran into some light enemy fire, and one soldier was wounded. Moshe Kelman, the commander of the third battalion understood by than, that outpost 13 was not conquered by the Fifth battalion men and that they are fighting on outpost 14, instead.; his men was again ordered to proceed toward outpost 13, and again his men ran into opposing fire. They withdrew. Operation HQ were unable to interpret the situation on the ground, and failed to realize the enormous advantage gained by the Fifth Battalion. Meanwhile, time was flying. For three more hours, the Fifth Battalion’s limited forces fought on, capturing most of the positions on the hill. The Legion began to withdraw, after three successive counterattacks failed, even though supported by artillery fire. Our forces, however, greatly reduced by severe losses, were growing weaker.
At operation HQ it was feared that the Fifth Battalion would be exposed by daylight, in the heart of the enemy camp, and without the support which they should have had. At 0530, the order was given to withdraw as rapidly as possible, without cover, before day should break. A hasty retreat began from the captured positions, coming under fire from the enemy, who were returning to their positions on outpost 14. During the withdrawal, our forces suffered further casualties, while striving to keep as well organized as possible. The uninjured soldiers kept up fire from the positions they still held, covering the retreat of 60 of their wounded companions. Some of the wounded were helped along by comrades, some were carried on stretchers; others moved unassisted.
As day broke, the Arabs recovered and returned to their abandoned positions. They resumed firing with every weapon they had. The last soldier to bring up the rear of the retreating forces was the company commander, Zivi Tzafriri.
In this battle we lost 18 men and 60 wounded.
Despite the overall failure, some positive achievements can be claimed. The Arab Legion, with its British patronage, lost some of its confidence and self-esteem. Legion forces were diverted from Jerusalem to Latrun, thus relieving some of the pressure on the besiged city. These forces were bottled up in the Latrun salient, and were thus prevented from being active elsewhere; and the section of road joining the ”Burma Road” to Sha’ar Hagai, which had hitherto been under fire from Latrun, was henceforward open to traffic.